## **EXHIBIT - 5**

Decision of March 15, 2012 (Transcript), MDL Docket Document No. 2585 (April 2, 2012), Estate of John P. O'Neill Sr., et al. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, et al., 04-CV-1922 (GBD)(FJM)

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    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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    SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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  SEPTEMBER 11, 2001,
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                                          New York, N.Y.
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                                          March 15, 2012
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                                          11:15 a.m.
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     Before:
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                       HON. GEORGE B. DANIELS
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                                               District Judge
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                           HON. FRANK MAAS
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                                             Magistrate Judge
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                             APPEARANCES
15
15
     COZEN O'CONNOR
16
         Attorneys for Plaintiff Federal Insurance Co.
16 BY: STEPHEN A. COZEN
17
            SEAN P. CARTER
17
18 KREINDLER & KREINDLER
18
         Attorney for Ashton Plaintiffs
    BY: JAMES P. KREINDLER
19
19
20
20 SPEISER, KRAUSE, NOLAN & GRANITO
21
          Attorney for Ashton Plaintiffs, et al.
21 BY: CHRISTINA M. FRY
22
22
23
     ANDERSON KILL & OLICK, P.C.
          Attorneys for O'Neill Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Executive
23
24 Committee
24 BY: JERRY S. GOLDMAN
            RENE HERTZOG
25
                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
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C3f9tera 1 APPEARANCES CONTINUED 1 2 MOTLEY RICE Attorneys for Plaintiff Burnett 2 BY: DONALD A. MIGLIORI 3 BRIAN T. FRUTIG 3 4 DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO 4 5 Attorney for Plaintiff Cantor Fitzgerald 5 BY: NIKOL GRUNING THOMPSON 6 6 DESIMONE, AVILES, SHORTER & OXAMENDI, LLP 7 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 BY: GARY P. DEUTSCHMEISTER 8 8 9 BERNABEI & WACHTEL 9 Attorney for Al Haramain USA 10 BY: ALAN KABAT 10 KELLOGG, HUBER, HANSEN, TODD, EVANS & FIGEL, P.L.L.C. 11 Attorneys for Defendant Saudi Arabia 11 BY: MICHAEL K. KELLOGG 12 12 WILLIAM J. RINNER 13 ROBBINS, RUSSELL, ENGLERT, ORSECK, UNTEREINER & SAUBER LLP 13 14 Attorney for Defendant Saudi High Commission 14 BY: ROY T. ENGLERT, JR. 15 15 PATTON BOGGS 16 Attorneys for Defendant National Commercial Bank BY: MITCHELL R. BERGER 16 17 ALAN T. DICKEY 18 19 20 21 22 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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 (In open court; case called)

THE COURT: Let me do this. Before we go to the motion for relief from the final judgment, let me address the issues that were raised by letter and put those aside and then see if there are other issues that we can quickly resolve and then I'll hear the parties with regard to that motion.

First of all, Magistrate Judge Maas and I have discussed the issue of entering judgment against Hezbollah based on the other judgments that were entered in this case and based on the inquest that Magistrate Judge Maas has done. We both agree that that is an appropriate thing to do. I'm willing to do that today. And we will enter judgment against Hezbollah in the amounts as were found by Magistrate Judge Maas when he did the inquest on damages.

The only thing we were both uncertain about and curious about and want to avoid having to do this piecemeal is that why at this point, we're at this issue and whether or not we should be thinking about others. I believe that judgment has not been entered against all the defaulting defendants in that case.

Are we going to anticipate a further application, or is this sufficient for your purposes at this point?

MR. CARTER: Your Honor, Sean Carter for the Federal Insurance Plaintiffs.

If I may provide a little bit of context, it will, I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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think, illuminate why we're here.

There is a presently ongoing a forfeiture action in the Northern District of Illinois through which the Department of Justice is targeting for seizure \$6.6 million in al-Qaeda assets.

At the time the window, statutory window for filing verified claims in the statutory -- in the forfeiture proceeding expired, we did not yet have a final monetary judgment against al-Qaeda.

As a result, the Department of Justice has argued in that forfeiture proceeding that we lack constitutional standing, the 9/11 plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to make claim in the forfeiture proceeding to those funds.

There are presently some separate forfeiture proceedings recently initiated targeting assets associated with Hezbollah in the Southern District of New York. And the reason there's some urgency with regard to the Hezbollah judgment is because we want to avoid the scenario in which we, again, face an argument about standing based on the timing of the judgment.

With regard to the entry of a broader number of judgments, I think that would make sense in order to avoid doing this piecemeal.

In some cases, defendants have objected principally I think because they're concerned about the potential that we would try to use the judgment against a terrorist organization SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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to execute against their assets.

It may make sense for us simply to try and enter into a broader stipulation with the defendants that will allow all the terrorist organizations to be treated simultaneously for purposes of a monetary judgment and we can deal with other of the defaulting defendants separately.

THE COURT: Similar to the agreement that you entered into with regard to Hezbollah?

MR. CARTER: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well just let us know at what point, if you intend to proceed that way, and we'll be prepared to move forward then. But we should have the judgment prepared and ready for you today and filed.

MR. CARTER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now with regard to the -- someone raised an issue -- also you raised an issue with regard to getting a certificate of default from the clerk's office. I'm not quite sure I understood exactly what your communication has been with the clerk's office, if any, on this issue and what if you still have a problem or the nature of that problem.

MR. MIGLIORI: Good morning, your Honor.

Don Migliori from Motley Rice on behalf of the Burnett plaintiffs.

All of other moving parties for this particular default have gotten their certificate. This is purely SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

6 C3f9tera ministerial. It just for some reason didn't come through for 1 2 the Burnett plaintiffs. THE COURT: Have you had a conversation with the 3 clerk's office? 4 5 MR. MIGLIORI: We wrote actually to the court I believe on the 30th of last year -- December 30 end of last 6 7 year about it. We've had some communication with the clerk's 8 office. 9 THE COURT: What is their position? 10 MR. MIGLIORI: Really don't have a clear answer from them. We're just looking for guidance. We didn't know if it 11 12 was caught up in a different -- in a different process 13 because --14 THE COURT: They have not said to you that it is not 15 going to be issued? 16 MR. MIGLIORI: I believe the response back has simply 17 been that they don't have -- they needed guidance. They 18 weren't going to accept from us in an informal conversation 19 that everything had been done. 20 We've checked our filings, our pleadings, and 21 everything is there. 22 THE COURT: What do they say is deficient? That's 23 what I don't understand. 24 MR. MIGLIORI: We don't understand. 25 So when we wrote to the court we were simply asking if SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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the court could give us some guidance, give us some help in pushing that process along because everything is there and it hasn't issued out.

THE COURT: I mean I could help you but I don't know what the problem is so I'm not sure what -- I haven't been able -- are you dealing with orders and judgments, the clerk?

MR. MIGLIORI: What I propose, your Honor, because -the motion is much more important. Maybe after this hearing
I'll go down personally.

THE COURT: Go to orders and judgments.

MR. MIGLIORI: As long as I can represent that there is no reason from the bench for this to not issue, maybe that will be the kind of assurance.

THE COURT: Not that I'm aware of. That's the thing.
Unless you can articulate for me either who is telling
you there's a problem and what the nature of that problem is,
I'm not sure if it's just not getting done, they have a
position that it cannot be done, they have a position that
something is missing, and you haven't assured them that it's
not missing. I'm not sure what the issue is.

MR. MIGLIORI: We just know that we've inquired and it's never forthcoming.

So as long as there is no other basis from the bench, I'll go down today and make direct contact. If there's another issue --

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THE COURT: I mean we made some inquiries down there but it's hard for me to communicate with them if I don't know what the problem is.

MR. MIGLIORI: They didn't articulate one to us either. As long as there's no issue from the bench.

THE COURT: Not that I'm aware of. So if there's -if you can get -- if you can tell me who you're speaking to and
it probably should be somebody in orders and judgments and they
can tell you that it's either going to issue or it's not going
to issue.

If it's not going to issue immediately, they have to articulate for you what the problem is so you can come back to me and see if we can solve that problem. Or if they say you're missing a document, they can tell you what document it is, if you think you've given it to them and they can't find it --

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  MIGLIORI: We wouldn't have bothered the court if that were the issue. Let me figure that out and I appreciate it

THE COURT: Sure. Just contact my chambers or Magistrate Judge Maas' chambers, either one, we'll follow up if necessary. But I'm not quite sure what the problem is that's holding this up.

Are there any other issues that we need to address before I go to the motion? I know you're moving forward with discovery.

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Did I see a hand?

No. All right. Then let me hear you with regard to the motion. Let's address that. I've reviewed the papers and reviewed all of the decisions. So why don't you tell me exactly what your position is.

MR. COZEN: If Your Honor please, Steve Cozen from Cozen O'Connor on behalf of the plaintiffs.

The motion before the court seeks, under Rule 60(b)(6), to vacate judgments entered in this MDL against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi High Commission, which after dismissal and appeal, became final when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in June of 2009.

However, on November 7, 2011 the Second Circuit in Doe v. Bin Laden and Afghanistan overruled the previous panel's decision in this case, held that 1605(a)(5), the noncommercial tort exclusion to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, is a basis for a suit arising out of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, validated the cause of action against a nondesignated foreign sovereign for providing material support to al-Qaeda, and ordered that the case should proceed.

THE COURT: When you say validated the cause of action, I'm not sure that they made that kind of determination.

MR. COZEN: When I say validated the cause of action, what I meant was they say there is a basis, based upon allegations with respect to the provision of material aid and

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support to sustain jurisdiction under 1605(a)(5) as a tort claim.

THE COURT: Wouldn't it be more accurate to say they said it could be a basis and they sent it back in that case for discovery to determine if, in fact, there was a basis.

MR. COZEN: Well, technically I would not defer or disagree with your Honor in this respect.

They sent it back for two things. One was to determine whether or not the, quote, whether the Taliban-was-the-government defense was an adequate defense. And the second was whether or not discretionary function was actually at play.

THE COURT: And that's the critical issue.

MR. COZEN: But the allegations of the complaint and the adoption of the -- the adoption of the district court opinion, together with the articulation of their reasons for their holding, to me validates the cause of action which is -- which was stated in the complaint that Afghanistan, through the Taliban, provided a safe haven for and provided material aid and support to al-Qaeda which enabled them to attack the United States.

THE COURT: Well, again, I don't think that that's completely accurate. It validated a possible cause of action. But the court specifically said -- as a matter of fact I'll quote from the opinion: "Let us be clear. We make no judgment SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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as to whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim or even to provide jurisdiction."

 $\,$  MR. COZEN: I'm not disagreeing, and perhaps I'm using the word in a general sense, your Honor.

The point is that the Second Circuit, of course, had previously, in August of '08, held in this case that the sole and exclusive basis for upholding the dismissal of our claims against the Kingdom and the Commission was the inapplicability of 1605(a)(5) and the presumed exclusivity of 1605A, the terrorist exception, to the acts complained of in our first amended complaint and in our RICO statements, although they credited our allegations as having been well detailed and well documented, that sole and exclusive basis, your Honor, has now been abrogated. And the law is as stated in Doe.

We are left then, if you will, with an anomalous situation. In the absence of a Rule 60(b)(6) relief in the same MDL, in which similar claims are made, against similarly situated sovereigns arising out of similar wrongful acts resulting from identical harm, that litigation may proceed against Afghanistan but not against Saudi Arabia or the Saudi High Commission.

THE COURT: But that's not -- again, that's not necessarily true.

If, as the Court said -- the Court said, indeed, the district court had ordered further discovery to provide for SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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fact-finding with regard to whether the alleged acts were attributable to Afghanistan and whether they were discretionary.

If that discovery determined that those acts aren't attributable to Afghanistan or that discovery establishes that they were discretionary acts, there is no cause of action in Afghanistan -- against Afghanistan.

MR. COZEN: Your Honor, I am not prejudging what final determination this court will make once that jurisdictional discovery is taken with respect to the existence of the cause of action by Afghan -- by the Doe plaintiffs against Afghanistan.

What I am saying is that the sole and exclusive basis for the dismissal of our claims against the Kingdom and the Commission were the applicability of 1605(a)(5), the tort exception on the theory -- never reaching the other issues -- simply on the theory that the terrorist exclusion or the terrorist exception trumped the tort exception. That has now been disposed of in the Second Circuit.

THE COURT: But, again, I went back and read all of the opinions very carefully. That's not accurate.

What's accurate that you said was that that may have been the sole and exclusive basis on which the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. But in reading Judge Casey's opinion, it was not the sole and exclusive basis on which Judge Casey SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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determined that there was no cause of action against Saudi Arabia.

MR. COZEN: That is correct, your Honor.

However, if you undoubtedly read again the Second Circuit opinion you'll note footnote fifteen where the court says since we have decided -- on page 49 of their opinion -- since we have decided that 1605(a)(5), the noncommercial tort exception, doesn't apply, it is trumped by 1605A, we don't reach any of the other assertions that -- as to whether or not there is or is not jurisdiction under it.

THE COURT: But I understand -- then I understand your argument. Your argument is that it should -- the judgment should be vacated simply because the Second Circuit didn't reach that issue on appeal as opposed -- you're not arguing that Judge Casey didn't address that issue in his decision.

MR. COZEN: I'm not arguing that Judge Casey didn't address that issue in his decision.

We argued the contrary in front of the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit never reached that because the
Second Circuit made the determination that 1605(a)(5), which
Judge Casey said was applicable, they said wasn't applicable.
So they never had to reach the subsequent issue of the
alternative grounds for dismissal.

THE COURT: Okay. So that --

MR. COZEN: So now what we are left with, your Honor, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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if you please, is that we have a rather perverse situation in which the plaintiffs in Afghanistan are entitled to proceed with their case.

I don't want to conflate -- and I would like this Court not to conflate -- the issue of whether or not we are entitled to 16 -- to Rule 60(b)(6) relief with the issue of whether or not the defendants, the Kingdom and the Commission, have a right to assert, once those judgments are open and they're back in the case, whether they have a right to assert that they have some legal basis for getting out of the case.

THE COURT: But that was all argued and litigated before Judge Casey. Why do you -MR. COZEN: But it was never determined on appeal.

THE COURT: But that's appeal.

I'm trying to figure out -- you're saying that even if it's decided by this court that because it wasn't addressed on appeal that you get a do-over?

MR. COZEN: Yes.

In fact, not only do we get a do-over. I'm saying I never had the right to have the Second Circuit determine whether or not my arguments as to why Judge Casey was wrong when he said I'm going to let them out on discretionary function, when the body of law that was developing was clear that discretionary function didn't apply when you violated international law and acts -- and laws of humanity. I never SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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got an opportunity to have that issue determined by the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COZEN: Because they first decided that the tort -- the noncommercial tort exception simply didn't apply.

Judge Casey, in fact, had said it did apply. So we're not here -- we're not here, your Honor, because of what Judge Casey held or what Judge Casey didn't hold.

We are here because in Doe v. Afghanistan they reversed the opinion in our case.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COZEN: And said you are entitled to go further and have your claims determined and heard.

THE COURT: No. They said you were entitled to a similar consideration that you received by Judge Casey. Isn't that really what they said?

MR. COZEN: No. Because then your Honor if that's the case, then are you telling me that I have a right now to file a new appeal from Judge Casey's original decision and ask the Court of Appeals to rehear the case years later?

That's not the procedure.

THE COURT: No. You would have the right, if I were to deny your motion, to appeal that denial of your motion on the basis in which you're arguing that the Second Circuit didn't have the opportunity to decide this issue and should now SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

C3f9tera decide this issue in the context of the ruling that's already 2 been made in this case. 3 MR. COZEN: Well I understand, your Honor. But I don't think that's how it works. 4 5 THE COURT: You want a do-over though. MR. COZEN: No --6 7 THE COURT: Judge Casey has already ruled. 8 Are you asking for a different ruling from me than 9 Judge Casey already gave you on this issue? MR. COZEN: Well, if Your Honor please, what I'm 10 asking first is that you rule on a 60(b)(6) motion. 11 12 THE COURT: To vacate and to do what? MR. COZEN: To vacate the judgment. 13 THE COURT: And do what? 14 MR. COZEN: To allow the defendants back in the case, 15 let them assert the same legal defenses. Let us argue them. 16 THE COURT: But you already did that. 17 MR. COZEN: No, but, your Honor --THE COURT: You did that before Judge Casey and Judge 18 19 20 Casey said the record is undisputed that these are discretionary acts. Isn't that what he ruled? 21 22 MR. COZEN: Excuse me, your Honor. No. 23 The fact of the matter is there was no -- there was no 24 evidentiary record in that regard. Judge Casey made the determination that this was -- that this was subject to the 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

17 C3f9tera discretionary function defense because of what he perceived the 1 2 law to be. 3 And what I'm suggesting, that's not the law of this case at this juncture. 5 THE COURT: But Judge Casey's determination was after you had a full opportunity to make the argument. MR. COZEN: Absolutely. 8 THE COURT: And you made the argument. 9 And if you thought at the time there was some disputed 10 evidence to offer, you had the obligation to present it at that 11 time because Judge Casey had not yet made a ruling. 12 MR. COZEN: Excuse me. THE COURT: And so Judge Casey -- you made the 13 complete argument that you had at the time. And Judge Casey --14 15 didn't he reject that argument? 16 MR. COZEN: Yes. But that is not the way it happened. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. COZEN: The way it happened, your Honor, was that 19 motions to dismiss were filed. 20 THE COURT: Right. 21 MR. COZEN: Our allegations -- and if you look at our 22 allegations in our first amended complaint, they go from 23 paragraph three -- as to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, from 398 24 to 505; including direct allegations of Saudi government 25 officials in the United States aiding the terrorists by union, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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aiding the terrorists in the United States.

They go to the whole issue of the Kingdom through its dominated and controlled charities and other nongovernmental organizations.

THE COURT: Okay.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace$  . COZEN: Using them as fronts to fund international terrorism.

Those allegations were not disputed factually. They were argued legally.

We believe Judge Casey made the wrong legal decision. We would think on the basis of --

THE COURT: Which part of the decision do you say is wrong that you should be able to argue again?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  COZEN: He only decided on -- as to the Kingdom on the basis of the discretionary function exclusion.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COZEN: And the fact of the matter is that when you look at the Doe case, Doe cites -- Doe cites, with approval, Liu and Letelier.

And Liu and Letelier stand for the proposition that any such activity as we have alleged where sovereign nations set about to kill other people, to assassinate them, to impose acts of terror upon them, are in and of themselves by their nature nondiscretionary.

So my position is that --SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

C3f9tera THE COURT: Well but that's not the allegation you 1 2 made against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. MR. COZEN: It certainly is. 3 THE COURT: That the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 4 specifically planned the torts that you're --5 MR. COZEN: No. That wasn't the allegation. 6 7 THE COURT: Right. That's not the allegation. MR. COZEN: But the allegation was the same allegation 8 9 as in Afghanistan. The allegation was that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia --10 THE COURT: Supported terrorists. 11 MR. COZEN: Supported international terrorism through 12 13 their dominated and controlled agents, servants, alter egos, etc., knowingly did so, fully foreseeing that they would attack 14 15 western interests including the United States. 16 THE COURT: And the circuit said if it turns out that 17 their investments and their contributions to charities were --18 are discretionary functions, then you can't sue them. 19 Isn't that --20 MR. COZEN: That is not what the circuit said at all. 21 THE COURT: Then what would be the purpose --22 MR. COZEN: That is not what the circuit said at all. They never reached the issue. 23 THE COURT: What would be the purpose of -- they said 24 that the district court -- they said the district court ordered 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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further discovery to provide for fact finding with regard to whether the alleged acts were attributable to Afghanistan and whether they were discretionary.

MR. COZEN: No. You're talking about Doe. You're talking about Doe.

And what happened in Doe was that the Second Circuit panel then approved, in a mini en banc procedure, said the allegations in the pleadings allege nondiscretionary acts. We're sending this back for jurisdictional discovery with regard to whether or not there were -- there was a discretionary function involved. So they have to litigate that.

THE COURT: Right. And that's already been litigated here.

MR. COZEN: No. It has not been litigated here. THE COURT: But you argued that in front of Judge

17 Casey.

MR. COZEN: But the fact is it has not been litigated here because we took that up on appeal. That was one of our main arguments --

THE COURT: I'm not talking about appeal. I'm talking about what was litigated here.

MR. COZEN: How can I be foreclosed --

THE COURT: You fully litigated that here, didn't you?

MR. COZEN: How can I be foreclosed -SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.
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THE COURT: That's not the question.

MR. COZEN: -- from having my day in court and my right to prove that these were nondiscretionary acts and have that argument in front of the Court of Appeals.

The only way that that can happen, your Honor, the only way that that can happen is if --

THE COURT: For me to do what?

MR. COZEN: Is if you do what 60(b)(6) gives you the inherent authority to do.

THE COURT: And what would that --

MR. COZEN: And that would be to vacate the judgments, bring them back into the case, let them assert whatever defenses they want to assert, both legal and factual. If discovery is necessary, we'll form and frame that discovery and take that discovery. And then you have to make a determination based upon that discovery as to whether or not discretionary function is really involved in this case.

Now, as to the other two alternatives -- and that's why you should never reach the alternative bases.

But as to the other two alternatives, that was disposed of in Doe. The caused by, and entire tort alternatives were disposed of by Doe specifically holding that on the exact same kind of set of facts, the damage occurred in the United States, the tort occurred in the United States, and, in fact, the caused by means general proximate cause.

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 They adopted. They said there is no question, no question that on the basis of the pleadings they meet all of the first five requirements in the litany of requirements under 1605(a)(5).

So, what I'm suggesting to the court is Rule 60(b)(6) has, as the Supreme Court says, gives this court the inherent power, in simple English, for any other reason to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.

I think it would be a perversion of justice not to bring them back into the case. And the jurisprudence of -- let me suggest to your Honor -- the jurisprudence of this circuit and other circuits is very helpful in this regard.

First, where a change in the law goes to the very basis of a claim or defense, that meets the exception or extraordinary circumstance that is required under the Rule 60(b)(6) test.

THE COURT: Well in what way does a change in the law with regard to whether or not the noncommercial tort exclusion could have applicability, how does a change in that law affect a determination that even if it does have applicability these are discretionary functions that take it outside?

MR. COZEN: It has applicability, your Honor, because you've got -- you have to then decide a factual -- a fact intensive question that Judge Casey didn't ever address.

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THE COURT: But he did address.

MR. COZEN: No, he addressed it, but not in a fact intensive inquiry.

THE COURT: Well I don't see on your papers what different set of facts that you claim exists now that you're relying on than the different set of facts that you were relying on in front of Judge Casey.

MR. COZEN: We have the same factual allegations. If there is a requirement for factual discovery to determine whether or not any specific laws were broken or whether the nature of the acts is violative of international law and the laws of humanity and, therefore, cannot be possibly discretionary, as Doe adopted by adopting the language of Liu -- the holdings of Liu and Letelier, then we're going -- we're going to have a basis for saying Judge Casey was wrong.

You should correct that wrong. And you should hold that the discretionary function exclusion doesn't exist.

But you don't reach that unless and until you recognize that since the sole and exclusive basis for dismissing our appeal was that 1605(a)(5) didn't apply. Now we know 1605(a)(5) does apply. So now let's apply it.

THE COURT: But Judge Casey did apply it. He applied that analysis, didn't he?

And he made a specific finding that because there were no factual disputes raised in the Court's resolution of this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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motion no jurisdictional discovery is necessary.

He specifically made that determination.

MR. COZEN: And we took that up saying that was wrong. And we never got an answer to that because the Court of Appeals made the determination that 1605(a)(5) didn't apply in the first instance.

We believe Judge Casey was wrong. We believe we will be able to convince you he was wrong.

THE COURT: That's what I'm asking. I understand your argument that you want an opportunity to argue to the circuit that Judge Casey was wrong.

How does that give you a do-over for Judge Casey's decision in front of me?

MR. COZEN: Your Honor, it is not so much a do-over of Judge Casey's decision as it is a right to bring parties back into a case who were improvidently let out of the case, bring them back in, and now deal with the issues that exist within 1605(a)(5).

If there is the need for jurisdictional discovery with regard to discretionary function or any other issue, we will engage in that. And you'll make the determination in that, whether there is a need.

THE COURT: Well that's a big "if."
You're not arguing that to me now.
I have no reason to believe that discovery is
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25 C3f9tera appropriate because Judge Casey said no factual disputes have 1 2 been raised. Jurisdictional discovery is not necessary or 3 appropriate. And you've put nothing in your papers to argue 4 that it is. 5 MR. COZEN: Well, excuse me, your Honor, but we have. 6 In fact, we have. 7 THE COURT: You've done discovery. So what facts 8 are --MR. COZEN: No. We didn't do any jurisdictional 9 10 discovery on discretionary function because there was no dispute. The Kingdom and the Commission did not dispute our 11 12 factual allegations. 13 THE COURT: So what's the dispute now? 14 MR. COZEN: The dispute now is whether or not if you 15 take -- if you still take our factual --16 THE COURT: The factual dispute. 17 MR. COZEN: I don't think there is because if you 18 take -- if you take our factual assertions --19 THE COURT: As Judge Casey did. 20 MR. COZEN: -- as true. 21 THE COURT: As Judge Casey did. 22 MR. COZEN: -- as true. 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 MR. COZEN: Then on the basis of the Doe decision and

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on the basis of Liu and Letelier I think you must come to the

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conclusion that no foreign sovereign can engage in the support of killing innocent people and say that is a discretionary act.

Now, the fact of the matter is, your Honor, sure, there are two ways to go about this. I think that this is the quintessential case for 60(b)(6) relief. Clearly, the sole and exclusive basis for throwing us out was that 1605(a)(5) didn't apply.

THE COURT: That wasn't the sole and exclusive basis of throwing you out.

MR. COZEN: It was.

THE COURT: It was not. Judge Casey went through the analysis that you asked him to go through.

Right?

MR. COZEN: No. Judge Casey found that 1605(a)(5) did apply but the discretionary function exclusion A knocked it out. We took that up to the Court of Appeals. We argued it in front of the Court of Appeals. They never reached that argument.

THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that.

MR. COZEN: So what I'm saying --

THE COURT: I'm trying to figure out whether you're simply trying to get me to redecide Judge Casey's decision or you're simply trying to find a mechanism to go back to the circuit and have them review on appeal what Judge Casey did. Those are two different issues.

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Are you asking me to simply get you back to the circuit so you can appeal Judge Casey's ruling again or are you asking me to make a different determination than Judge Casey did on the exact same record that both of us have? MR. COZEN: I'm asking you to do two things. I'm asking you, one, to rule on the 60(b)(6) motion

which is well grounded and is the quintessential type of case in which it would be a perversion of justice for this court --THE COURT: Well that doesn't answer the question that

I just asked you.

MR. COZEN: I'm trying to answer.

THE COURT: That doesn't answer the question I asked Are you asking me -you.

MR. COZEN: I'm telling you.

THE COURT: No, you didn't tell me. I gave you two choices and you've given me a third.

MR. COZEN: No.

THE COURT: I asked you a specific question. Are you asking me -- you want me to give you 60(b)(6) relief so that you can have an opportunity to relitigate the issue that was decided by Judge Casey, or are you asking for 60(b)(6) relief so you can go back to the circuit and appeal Judge Casey's decision?

> Which one of those two are you asking me to do? MR. COZEN: Both. And I'll tell you why. Now I'll SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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THE COURT: Well I can't do both.

 $\ensuremath{\mathtt{MR}}.$  COZEN: Well, you can. Because you have two separate issues before you.

The first issue you have is whether 60(b)(6) relief is justified.

Forget about what the defenses may be. Forget about what the legal arguments may be as to ultimately why the claim ought to be dismissed. We don't agree, but leave that aside.

The only question before this court right now is whether or not to grant or not grant 60(b)(6) relief where there has been, after a full and complete appeal and a sole and exclusive basis saying 1605(a)(5) doesn't apply, a total reversal by the Court of Appeals. And you have another case, whatever happens to it, another case, identical situation, identical for wrongful acts, identical assertions against another sovereign state, identically in the same position as Saudi Arabia. That's going to go forward. What results in that, I don't know.

THE COURT: It could end up being the same result as in this case. I don't know.

MR. COZEN: May be. I don't know either. I'm not prejudging that. I'm not conflating the two.

If I get my 60(b)(6) relief, then I'm sure that my friends on the other side will assert as defenses, legally and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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perhaps factually, which they didn't do before, the alleged alternative grounds or maybe at least one of the alleged alternative grounds that they have asserted in their papers.

Your Honor will have to make a decision as to whether or not those have legal validity.

We want the opportunity to argue before you that they do not have legal validity based upon the jurisprudence that has grown up, particularly the adoption by Doe of Liu and Letelier and the other case law that is developed in the various circuits with respect to these issues.

We want to have the opportunity to argue that to you. You may conclude, after we argue that, that, you know, I don't think there is enough, just by the assertions and the RICO statements, I don't think there is enough for me to decide this. I want some additional jurisdictional discovery.

Or you may conclude I think Judge Casey got it right. I'm going to hold the same way.

And now we'll go up on appeal on that narrow issue. And the Court of Appeals will hear us on that narrow issue.

But you can't get there at all -- you can't get there at all unless you first do what is the right and proper thing to do and which I believe would be an abuse of discretion not to do, which is to take a change of the law that goes right to the heart of our right to be in court, 9/11 victims to have their day in court and throw them out and say no, I'm not going SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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to relieve the judgment.

Now, it may very well be -- it may very well be that at the end of the day you come to the same conclusion as Judge Casey did or you come to a different conclusion from what Judge Casey did. In either event, one of us will then take that narrow question up on appeal to the Second Circuit and now the Second Circuit will have to deal with it.

On the other hand, if you were to deny what I believe we are so clearly entitled to, which is the 60(b)(6) relief and vacate that judgment, then we will go up to the Second Circuit saying that you abused your discretion. And the Second Circuit will make a determination as to whether you did or did not abuse your discretion. It will not, however, have before it, nor will it have the ability to decide whether or not Judge Casey was right in the first instance back in 2005. That won't be before the Second Circuit.

So the only way to get there, the only way to get there for both sides, if that's the issue that has to be decided -- I make it clear, once again, I personally don't believe it has to be decided because I believe that the Second Circuit in Doe by their articulation and adoption of Liu and Letelier and the importance of Liu and Letelier in the 1605(a)(5) context, the fact that Congress had it in front of them when they passed the terrorist exception and that Letelier specifically says, and Liu also refers to the fact that you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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can't have discretion to kill people. That's not a discretionary act.

So let's make it clear. The discretion we're talking about is not the state's discretion to give money to charity. That's a red herring. We're talking about the state's right to fund international terrorism knowing the foreseeable and probable result and to be held accountable for it.

So the only way that we can resolve what apparently, your Honor, is a dilemma that you have articulated, which is do you want a do-over when Judge Casey decided against you in 2005, is to grant the 60(b)(6) relief. That's a different issue.

Are we entitled to that because a change in the law where our case was gutted by the wrong law, go back and argue again on the present record, or on a more fulsome record if your Honor believes that there should be developed a more fulsome record, together with Magistrate Judge Maas. And then have you make that determination. Are these other alternative grounds -- none of which Judge Casey accepted, by the way -- are these -- other discretionary function -- are these other alternative grounds valid? Do they have any substance?

You have to make that decision, your Honor. And when you make that decision, for me or against me, I then have an ability to go to the Second Circuit and say to the Second Circuit here's the specific holding. You know that 1605(a)(5)

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 is applicable. Here is why we were thrown out. Or here is why we were kept in. Was it right or wrong?

But I can't get there simply by taking you up to the circuit on the abuse of discretion standard if you deny my Rule 60(b)(6) application. That I can't do. Because that will not encompass that question.

And that's why I've asked you, please, sir, to understand -- and I think the case law is pretty clear on this. That's why such broad discretion is granted, why you have this great reservoir to do equity here.

Let's not conflate the two. 60(b)(6) gives you the unfettered authority to vacate the judgments. Once those judgments are vacated, we'll have plenty of time to argue all of the implications of the Doe decision, all of the implications of Liu and Letelier and any other legal defenses that the defendants want to put forward.

But since we were thrown out by an -- what is now an erroneous interpretation of the law, has been determined by the circuit to be an erroneous interpretation of the law, that went to the very heart and gut of our right to even be in the case, we have a right -- I would suggest particularly in view of the fact you're going to have to deal -- you've got -- let me make one final point because I think you've probably heard enough from me. Let me make one final point.

You've got Afghanistan over here and the Doe SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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plaintiffs are just like our plaintiffs. They're proceeding against Afghanistan. You're going to have to decide that. But they're proceeding. They have a right to proceed.

We, on the other hand, same case, same facts, same wrongful acts, same kind of theories, don't have the right to proceed. That can't be. We may have a right to proceed and lose or we may have a right to proceed and win. But we have a right to proceed.

And, in fact, any decision other than the granting of our 60(b)(6) motion would be in derogation of and undercut the whole theory behind the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Because the purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, particularly when you read the House report, when that act was passed back in 1976, was to bring uniformity of treatment between every sovereign state. Uniformity of treatment.

You're not going to have uniformity of treatment if in your same MDL some 9/11 victims have a right to go ahead and sue Afghanistan and other 9/11 victims don't have a right to go ahead and sue Saudi Arabia and the Saudi High Commission.

At the end of the day, you may decide for other reasons we're right or we're wrong and somebody is going to take it up on appeal.

But you won't have that inconsistency which undermines the very thesis and the very basis of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in the first place, which is to bring uniformity SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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to the treatment of every foreign state.

And of course I'm referring to those -- other than those who have been designated as state sponsors of terrorism. They're in a different category.

So, I would urge this court that when you read Doe, when you see footnote fifteen and you recognize that the sole and exclusive basis on which we were thrown out by the circuit was one that has been overruled and abrogated, we have a right to bridge the -- and we're timely. We brought the motion timely. The instrumentalities and agencies which they control and dominate are still in this case. Some are up on appeal. Some are still before you. It's only been two years since the Supreme Court denied our petition for cert. And I won't get into the arguments as to whether or not there is even a shorter period of time. But justice and equity require that the 60(b)(6) motion be granted, that we be given the opportunity to have them back in the case.

And then we'll litigate those issues. If you feel the same as Judge Casey did on the basis merely of allegations and you want to construe discretion the way he did, which is the discretion to decide to give to charities as opposed to the discretion to finance terrorism to kill people, that will be your determination. But we'll have a clean shot in the circuit which we can never get simply by going up on a denial on an abuse of discretion basis.

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THE COURT: Let me hear from the other side. Yes.

MR. KELLOGG: Good morning, your Honor.

Michael Kellogg. I represent the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I'll also be speaking on behalf of the Saudi High Commission, which is represented by Roy Englert.

The plaintiffs have conceded, as your Honor has pointed out, that there has been no change in the decisional law on which Judge Casey based his decision back in 2005. As a consequence, the whole premise of their 60(b)(6) motion is lacking.

Judge Casey agreed with the position ultimately adopted by the Second Circuit that a tort act could proceed and was not precluded by the fact that it did not fall within the state sponsorship of terrorism exception. But he held that it was a discretionary function based on the allegations made by the plaintiffs, based on the evidence presented by the Saudi High Commission, based on the representations made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The plaintiffs made all of these arguments that they want to make again at that time.

They argued Letelier and Liu. They argued that
Bayoumi might have been an agent of Saudi Arabia. They sought
jurisdictional discovery which Judge Casey properly denied
under the Second Circuit's precedent in Virtual Countries v.
Republic of South Africa that when a sovereign state comes in
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and asserts FSIA immunity it is the responsibility of the plaintiffs to present evidence -- not just allegations but evidence to dispute that in order to go forward and get jurisdictional discovery.

Now, Judge Casey held you haven't made that showing. He denied their request for jurisdictional discovery.

They did not even appeal that discretionary decision to deny them jurisdictional discovery. Instead, they went on the record as it was before Judge Casey and they argued that the discretionary function exception did not apply.

Now, of course the Second Circuit did not reach that decision because it held, based on the state sponsorship of terrorism exception, that they didn't even have to go there.

Judge Casey, of course, agreed with the position taken by the Second Circuit now in the Doe case which is why he reached the discretionary function exception.

THE COURT: Well when you say he agreed, that wasn't his ruling.

MR. KELLOGG: He agreed with that -- his ruling was based on the discretionary function exception. That's correct.

THE COURT: Well, no, his ruling was based on the inapplicability of the exception.

MR. KELLOGG: It was based on the inapplicability of the tort exception because it was a discretionary function.

THE COURT: Well the -- those are alternative SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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determinations. I don't remember Judge Casey saying -- making a ruling that, in fact, that the noncommercial tort exception did apply.

MR. KELLOGG: No. He held that it did not apply. THE COURT: Right.

MR. KELLOGG: He also held that it was not precluded by the state sponsorship of terrorism provision, the provision about providing material support to terrorists. So in that respect he ultimately agreed with what the circuit held in Doe which is why he went on to reach the discretionary function exception and held in our favor.

The solicitor general representing the department of justice and the department of state was invited by the Supreme Court to file a brief on the petition for certiorari. And they -- although they disagreed in some respects, as well with the Second Circuit's reasoning, they agreed with the result and they said -- and I'm quoting from the amicus brief at three, four.

"The lower courts correctly concluded that Saudi Arabia and its officials are immune from suit for governmental acts outside the United States. While the United States disagrees in certain respects with the analysis of the court of appeals further review by this Court to determine the best legal basis for that immunity is unwarranted."

And the Supreme Court followed the solicitor general's SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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recommendation and denied certiorari.

Now, nothing in Doe has cast any doubt on what the solicitor general had to say or on Judge Casey's original decision in this case.

THE COURT: Well why is the solicitor general's advocacies determinative one way or the other?

MR. KELLOGG: It is not. What is determinative is Judge Casey's decision. I simply raised that to point out that the United States, the state department, etc., agreed with Judge Casey's original decision to deny the case and said that further proceedings were unnecessary and inappropriate particularly in an FSIA context where the burdens of litigation on a sovereign state are supposed to be avoided as promptly as possible if a relevant exclusion applies.

Now as your Honor quoted, the court in Doe said let us be clear. We make no judgment as to whether the allegations in that complaint are sufficient to state a claim or even to provide jurisdiction. They simply remanded for this court to make its own determination as to whether the discretionary function exception applied.

Counsel makes a great deal of the fact that they cited Letelier and Liu. They cited Letelier and Liu only for the proposition that a terrorist attack within the United States could fall within the tort's exception to immunity. But they did not make any determinations regarding whether the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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discretionary function exception applied. And they remanded to this court.

Indeed, and quite remarkably, they cited Judge Casey's earlier discretionary function exception with approval noting that he dismissed, quote, similar claims against Saudi Arabia and instrumentalities, quote, after finding the alleged acts encompassed in the discretionary acts exemption.

So it could hardly be calling into question Judge Casey's prior decision in this case.

Now as I noted, plaintiffs are now arguing that they want jurisdictional discovery. Judge Casey denied them jurisdictional discovery and they did not even appeal that determination.

So, the whole premise of their 60(b)(6) motion is simply mistaken. There has been no change in the decisional law on which this court's decision was based.

Judge Casey granted the motion to dismiss over seven years ago, in 2005. Final judgment was entered in January of 2006. And I would note it was entered at the behest and the urging of the plaintiffs who wanted finality so that they could take that appeal.

Now, there were three cases against the Saudi High Commission. That were not part of that original judgment. But there was a stipulation entered in May of 2005 that specifically said the parties hereto, quote, will adopt as a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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binding order in the action with regard to Saudi High Commission the order of this court deciding the consolidated cases.

So effectively this final judgment applied to the Saudi High Commission as well in all of the cases. It applied to Saudi Arabia itself in all of the cases. That is over six years ago that the cases -- that final judgments were entered.

THE COURT: Well, you don't argue, though, that they had the basis to raise this issue prior to the Court's decision in November.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  KELLOGG: I'm sorry. Your Honor I didn't quite catch that.

THE COURT: You're not arguing that it's -- that they should have -- they had an opportunity to timely make this motion based upon the Court's -- the Circuit's most recent decision at any time prior to November when the Court issued its opinion.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  KELLOGG: Well, of course. It's a change in decisional law. And that's the basis of their motion.

But the Second Circuit has made absolutely clear that a change in decisional law is not a, quote unquote, extraordinary circumstance sufficient to warrant vacating a prior final judgment.

They said that quite clearly in the DeWeerth case cited in our briefs; that even when a prior judgment turns out SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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to be wrong that is not a basis for disturbing the finality of that judgment, particularly not a seven-year-old final judgment.

Now plaintiffs accordingly argue that there's certain equitable factors that justify reopening it in this case. They say there's a risk of inconsistent judgment.

Well the Second Circuit dealt with that issue as well in United Airlines v. Brien, which we cite in our case.

And they said specifically at page 176 of their opinion, potential hardship resulting from inconsistent judgment is, quote, not by itself sufficiently extraordinary to justify reopening a judgment.

All of the cases the plaintiffs cite are not only much fresher than the final judgments at issue here but they were cases in which inconsistent results against the same defendant was at issue. The defendant was still in the case. One plaintiff was going to be able to proceed and one plaintiff was not going to be able to proceed. And the reason for that had to do, generally when the court granted, with one case had been removed to federal court. And the federal court, anticipating under Erie what the state court was going to decide, tried to make a judgment and got it wrong. Those are the factual scenarios in which the courts have, in rare circumstances, granted a 60(b)(6).

We have nothing of that sort here. The fact that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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Afghanistan remains in the case for now is not a reason to reopen the case against Saudi Arabia and the Saudi High Commission who have been out of this litigation for years. There's nothing perverse about that. That's standard litigation practice.

And, indeed, it was urged by plaintiffs themselves.

As I said, they sought the final judgments, the Rule 54(b) judgments in this case in May of 2005. Their motion for entry of final judgment against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and they said, quote, this is at page seven of their motion, the claims against each defendant can be separately enforced; accordingly, the claims against the defendants are separable from the surviving claims.

And, again, they said the judgments themselves -- the judgments entered on behalf of the defendants could not be more final. That's what they said about the judgments against the Kingdom and the Saudi High Commission.

So the finality of those judgments, which was urged by the plaintiffs, has to be respected at this point.

Plaintiffs have cited no case under 60(b)(6) remotely comparable to the circumstances at issue here.

Now, they argue: Well there would be no hardship on the defendants if they were brought back into the case seven years later.

That is emphatically not the case.

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These cases have been closed for a long time. Sovereign immunity under the FSIA, as the Second Circuit stressed in the Robinson case, is not just from liability; it's also from the burdens of litigation. And it would be contrary to establish principles of sovereign immunity to require Saudi Arabia in an instrumentality to now come back into the case and bear the burdens of litigation.

Again, this is a point the plaintiffs made seven years ago in their motion for entry of final judgment. And I'd like to quote again from that at page eleven.

It says in cases involving dismissals based on sovereign immunity grounds, considerations of fairness to the dismissed parties weigh heavily in favor of early appeal and swift final dismissal from protracted litigation. In such cases should this court's order of dismissal ultimately be sustained -- and here's the critical part quoted from them -- these parties are entitled to the finality such relief promises as soon as possible, not years in the future, and without the substantial costs and uncertainty of being forced to submit to litigation until an appeal finally ripens. They got their wish. They got their appeal. They lost. They sought Supreme Court review. They lost.

Now, the Second Circuit has subsequently changed the decisional law on which it decided this case. But the Second Circuit has always made clear that is not a basis for reopening SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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the judgment.

Afghanistan, I should note that the allegations against Afghanistan are very different from those against the Saudi High Commission and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as described by Judge Casey.

They argue -- and I'm quoting here from the F.Supp. District court decision. They argue that Afghanistan expressly agreed to conduct illegal and unlawful terrorist attacks on the United States.

Now, in discovery on remand Afghanistan is going to have an opportunity to put in evidence on that. There will be jurisdictional discovery, to see if there's any such basis for analogies like that.

But there was no comparable allegation against Saudi Arabia.

The allegation against Saudi Arabia, as Mr. Cozen conceded, was not that they helped plan the attacks; not that they agreed to attack the United States. The allegation was that they set up certain charitable organizations in Bosnia, in other locations, and provided money to those that ultimately found its way into the hands of terrorists.

The one allegation that they harp upon concerns a Mr. Bayoumi in California who they claim -- they claim it more directly now, but in their complaint they said suggested that he might be an agent of Saudi Arabia. Judge Casey looked at SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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those allegations, held that the discretionary function applied.

Letelier and Liu are very different cases where the agents of the foreign government actually went in and committed murders in the United States. And the courts there held that the discretionary function exception did not apply.

Judge Casey considered all of that and made a very careful, considered decision that discretionary function does apply. That decision has held up for seven years now. It's a final judgment. And it's completely inappropriate and completely unjustified under the case law to now reopen it, drag sovereign entities back into court to defend themselves against charges that they successfully defeated and had dismissed seven years ago.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you want to respond?

MR. COZEN: Yes, I would like to respond, your Honor. On several different bases.

In the first place I think it's very, very important for this court to recognize that Judge Casey denied us jurisdictional discovery because he viewed the discretion as the right of the state to give money to charity, which was not the basis or the gravamen of our complaint to begin with.

Number two, the Doe panel on the basis of the pleadings -- and I would direct your Honor to the district SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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court opinion in Doe.

Because in the district court opinion in Doe you will see that they set forth what all of the allegations were against Afghanistan; that they provided material support and resources, including a safe haven of base of operations, that they had meetings to plan activity -- terrorist activities such as Bayoumi, which we said directly took place in the United States.

What I'm trying to point out to you, is this, your Honor, having said all of that, what did the Doe panel do?

The Doe panel went ahead and they said 1605(a)(5)
applies. We agree with the district court that it does. We disagree with our prior brethren here in the circuit.

Now this is the law of the circuit. Based upon the pleadings, we are now sending this back for jurisdictional discovery.

At the very least, that's what ought to happen here if it is necessary to do so because our defendant colleagues dispute or disagree with our factual assertions.

So, if you want to follow Doe, because our panel didn't, then you've got to say, okay, let's take a look at the pleadings and let's have some jurisdictional discovery on the issue of discretionary function.

I would, again, urge this court that the terrorist attacks three-panel clearly understood our claims differently SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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from what Judge Casey understood them as.

Judge Casey cast them as the Kingdom decided to give money to charities and that was a policy decision. Even our court of appeals didn't see it that way. When you read their recitation of the facts, the inferences that could be gleaned from our factual recitation, they saw it entirely differently. They saw it exactly what we meant.

That wasn't the decision we were complaining about. The decision we were complaining about was their decision to use charities and banks as fronts and alter egos to become part and parcel of al-Qaeda and fund terrorism throughout the world and with foreseeable consequences in the United States.

So, even our panel didn't see the facts the way Judge Casey saw the facts. So if Doe says, on the basis of the pleadings go take discovery, we ought to have that same right.

Now, that gets to Mr. Kellogg's other notion that somehow this is really good for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Somehow the balance that we ought to -- that we ought to draw here is taking one foreign sovereign and protecting it from having to litigate. But taking another foreign sovereign identically situated and say you have to litigate.

I suggest to you no, your Honor. Take a look at the House discussion of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the language that they use. Their primary overriding concern SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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 was uniformity of treatment between foreign states. You can't have one foreign state in an identical case being treated differently than another foreign state.

If they're entitled -- if 9/11 victims are entitled to sue Afghanistan and get discovery on what kind -- what does discretionary function mean? Does it mean that they violated a law, which means it couldn't be discretionary? Or does it mean that we adopt Liu an Letelier; i.e., if you violate the laws of humanity and international law by setting upon helping to attack innocent people and killing them, that can't be discretionary, that's another whole set of issues.

We're happy to go and meet with them on that battlefield. We never had the opportunity to do so because Judge Casey denied us the right to do so. And the Doe panel didn't deny the right to do so to Afghanistan.

And they continue to neglect the fact that we asserted the Bayoumi role in this whole thing and, in fact, as Senator Graham said he was convinced that Bayoumi acting as a Saudi government official was directly involved in the 9/11 attacks. Whether or not a finder of fact later determines that to be the case is a different issue. But it certainly doesn't even come close to dealing with a discretionary function exclusion.

Now I would say -- I would say to your Honor, you know, you take a look at Doe. Don't just take a look at the circuit case. Take a look at the district court case. See the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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allegations that they had in front of them. See the relief that the circuit gave them. And note, note, please, that they point out in Doe that in the debate surrounding the adoption of the terrorism exception, the prior cases, Liu and Letelier were actually, not just presumptively, but actually before them. They were aware of their existence and they discussed them. And it was Letelier that said those decisions make clear that a foreign state has no discretion to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the assassination of an individual or individuals; action that is clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international law.

So, the point that I make here, your Honor, is if you view, as Judge Casey viewed, which the Court of Appeals didn't view it the same way, but if you view the decision that has to be viewed -- that has to be examined for discretion as we're going to give money to Islamic charities, that's not what this case is all about. Doe didn't view it that way in looking at the activities of Afghanistan. They viewed it differently. And our Court of Appeals panel, headed by Chief Judge Jacobs viewed it differently. They understood exactly what the gravamen of our complaint was. And it wasn't about making a decision to give money to charity. It was about using charities as a front and as an integral component of al-Qaeda for the purpose of perpetuating the establishment of an international structure of terrorism capable of attacking the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.